In a recent paper, Leeper, Walker, and Yang argue that economic agents can often anticipate fiscal policy actions.
1 Because of lags in legislating and implementing fiscal policy, private agents can often anticipate future changes in tax policy and government spending before these changes actually occur, a phenomenon referred to as fiscal foresight. Econometric analysis that fails to model fiscal foresight may obtain tax and spending multipliers that are biased. One way researchers have attempted to deal the problem of fiscal foresight is by examining the narrative history of government revenue and spending news. Using information obtained from the legislative record, Ramey has constructed a series for exogenous federal government spending shocks based on the narrative record for defense spending.
2 Ramey shows that shocks to the series based on professional forecasts and shocks to the series based on the narrative approach Granger-cause the VAR shocks, indicating that the VAR shocks may miss the timing of the news. Following a similar approach, and paralleling their earlier work on changes in monetary policy, Romer and Romer were able to document federal tax policy changes. 3 The Great Recession and efforts by the federal government through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) to stimulate the economy returned fiscal policy, and in particular the role of state and local governments in such policies, to the center of macro-economic policymaking. The striking features of this legislation are its scale and its reliance upon state and local governments for implementing central government macro-economic fiscal policy. In a companion paper we use federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of the ARRA. 4 The purpose of this paper is to develop narrative measures of the federal grants-in-aid programs beginning with the Federal Highway Act of 1956 through the ARRA of 2009. The narrative measures we develop will be used as instruments for federal grants-in-aid in our subsequent analysis of the ARRA.
Beginning in the early 1950s the federal government assumed a more important role in the financing of state and local government programs. Prior to this time the federal government's only significant assistance for state and local government activities was funding for state lower income assistance and unemployment insurance, hereafter UI. 5 Since 1950, there have been 17 significant new federal programs funding state and local governments, including the most recent expansion of federal support under the ARRA of 2009. 6 In addition we also include as "federal aid" the states' settlement with U.S. tobacco companies, known as the Master Settlement Agreement, for a payment of $206 billion over a 25-year period to help cover the states' costs for tobacco-related illnesses. The settlement payments may be allocated to any state activity, much like federal revenue sharing. 7 Only new programs are considered in this narrative analysis as "unanticipated" changes in federal support for state and local governments. We assume that each of the new programs listed here was not funded by decreases in other federal aid to state/local governments but rather by increases in federal taxes or federal debt or by a reduction in other (nonaid) federal programs. Thus, new expenditures on these new programs are therefore additional funding to the state and local sectors.
In addition, federal aid programs to state or local governments are treated as a combined transfer of resources to a single state and local government sector. In most cases, federal aid is paid directly to the state government, and the state has the option of passing the aid through to local governments. In some instances, however, local governments do receive direct federal support (Urban Renewal, Model Cities, and General Revenue Sharing) . In these cases we assume that state governments see through the fiscal "veil" and adjust their subsequent funding of local programs in response. 8 Not included in our analysis of new federal aid are all changes in the federal tax code that impact state revenues. Many states collect their state income taxes using the federal income tax definition of taxable income. Thus, changes in tax exemptions or tax deductions impact the state tax base and thus state tax revenues. These effects were most pronounced with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated many deductions in the federal income tax base. The consequence was to significantly increase the common income tax base and, thus, state tax revenues collected at existing rates. 9 The reason for excluding these policy changes here is that the resulting changes in state revenues arise from transfers between residents within the state. Our focus here is on "unexpected" changes in revenues to the residents of a state from those 6 Strictly speaking, ARRA funding for the state and local sectors is not a "new program," since it uses existing federal programs to channel significant increases in federal support for the state and local sectors. The magnitude of federal support is "new," however, and therefore, we include the program in our analysis. See R.P. Inman, "States in Fiscal Distress," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Regional Economic Development, 6, 1, 2010. 7 One might think of such payments as beginning with a tax on tobacco company profits and the revenue from that tax is then re-allocated as state grants-in-aid; see p. 19.
"outside" the state.
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Two final decisions are required when specifying the level and timing of new aid to the state and local sectors.
Level of Aid:
For all new programs we will assume that the level of "new money" assigned to the program is the appropriated funding for the first full fiscal year of the program's implementation. Program funding for any future fiscal year after initial approval and funding is subject to future budgetary decisions of Congress.
11
The municipal bond market typically refuses to lend states money against this future stream of program aid for just this reason. 12 In this respect, our specification of narrative state aid follows that in Romer and Romer's study of the impact of shocks to taxation on economic outcomes. 13 There are three exceptions to our "first-year-only" specification for the level of the expenditure shock:
The Loss of General Revenue Sharing: This is an announcement by President Reagan in November 1983 to phase out general revenue sharing by FY 1987. We measure this as a one-time loss in fiscal wealth in Quarter 4, 1983; see pages 15-16 below. 10 Of course, state residents do contribute to the funding of aid programs in their state through current or future federal taxes. So in the aggregate, residents in "all" state and local governments do pay for "all" federal aid. This is a Ricardian equivalence argument. If such programs are to have any effect on the real economy -such as an increase in household wealth -we will need a non-Ricardian "wedge" in some form. Three such wedges are possible: 1) Residents do not live forever and have no bequest motive so that federal aid can be an intergenerational transfer; 2) Aid is fully funded within the current generation, but it is a transfer from richer national taxpayers to credit-constrained poorer households through state and local government spending; or 3) State residents suffer from a fiscal illusion of "universalism," whereby each state views all federal programs in its state as costing (approximately) 1/50th of the true program costs. Each of these specifications would allow new federal aid programs to be seen as "new wealth" by state residents.
11 While new programs often have authorized funding for perhaps up to five years, appropriated funding is decided each year. Authorizations are not binding commitments to spend resources and may be "held off" if the budget committees in Congress feel that this is appropriate. Only appropriations lead to new money for the states and appropriations are annual. See Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, and Process, Brookings Institution Press, 3 rd ed., Chapters 8 and 9, but particularly p. 205.
12 The municipal bond market will lend money in anticipation of future federal aid within the fiscal year, however, once federal funding is assured. Such notes are called revenue anticipation notes, or RANs. In this sense, state and local governments are credit constrained in their access to future years' payments from any new federal aid program. For evidence that state and local governments are credit constrained, see Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Harvey Rosen, and Schuyler Tilly, "Intertemporal Analysis of State and Local Government Spending: Theory and Tests," Journal of Urban Economics, 38, 1994, pp. 159-174. 13 See Romer and Romer, op. cit. An alternative approach to measuring the fiscal shock of spending is presented in Ramey, op. cit.
The Emergency Jobs Act of 1983:
This program was a commitment of federal aid for capital spending by state and local governments for two years. Since the program was budgeted for two years and was specified for capital spending, long-term debt could be issued in anticipation of second-year funding; see pages 16-17 below.
1998 Tobacco Settlement: In contrast to politically decided federal aid, tobacco settlement payments are the result of binding legal agreements. States have borrowed successfully against their future tobacco settlement payments. Therefore, we use the full discounted present value of all future settlement payments as our specification of new wealth to the state and local sector; see pages 19 -20.
2.
Timing of Aid: We specify three dates at which state and local officials could begin budgeting in anticipation of the new federal assistance: (i) the date of introduction as legislation; (ii) the date of passage if introduced by the President or the date of signing if there is a risk of a veto; and finally, (iii) the date of first federal funding.
14 As stressed by Ramey, the timing of how aid is received will be important for inferences of the effects of policy on publicand private-sector decisions. 15 We recommend either of three approaches for allocating an "aid shock" to the relevant quarters when estimating models of state and local fiscal behavior and the impact of aid on the macro economy.
16
In the discussion below, the dating of quarters is based on calendar accounting -Q1 is January-March, Q2 is April-June, Q3 is July-September, and Q4 is October-December -but the discussion is "timed" to the state and local sectors' fiscal year, specified as Q3 and Q4 in calendar year t, and Q1 and Q2 in calendar year t + 1.
14 In reporting our results, we recognize that beginning in FY 1977, the federal fiscal year shifted from a July 1 to June 30 fiscal year to an October 1 to September 30 fiscal year. For all years up to FY 1977, the first quarter of the fiscal year funding will be calendar Q3. For all fiscal years including and after FY 1977, the first quarter of the fiscal year will be calendar Q4. 15 Ramey, op. cit. 16 A fourth alternative is to adopt the date that legislation is first introduced or discussed. Our discussion below provides the political history for each program and appropriate references. In contrast to private firms and households reacting to "defense news" as in Ramey (2011), state governments cannot borrow against proposed federal legislation because of borrowing constraints imposed by the municipal bond market. States do have their own savings accounts, but those funds are typically earmarked for specific tasks (pension funds, bond funds). There are "rainy day funds," but those funds are relatively new and small relative to many aid shocks, and typically constrained to be used only in the event of "fiscal crises." Finally, unconstrained households could save or borrow against future service and tax changes because of aid shocks if citizens trusted state and local government officials to implement their preferred fiscal policies. It seems more appropriate from a political economy perspective to assume that most households are "rationed" against the fiscal choices of their elected representatives. We therefore work within the financial and budgetary constraints of the state and local sector.
APPROACH 1: This approach follows Romer and Romer's specification for shocks to federal tax policy and assigns the aid shock to only that quarter in which aid is first received.
17 This approach recognizes the municipal bond market constraint that state and local governments cannot borrow against future aid payments until those payments are viewed as fully secure. All fiscal responses by state and local governments are assumed to occur in the quarter when the funds arrive.
APPROACH 2: Adopt the first date of federal funding as the "funding date" for intergovernmental aid but then annualize the data for the remaining quarters in the fiscal year in which the aid is first received. This approach is consistent with the annualized treatment of federal aid in NIPA and other federal reporting of intergovernmental transfers. Implicitly, this approach assumes that once aid is secured, state and local governments can save that aid for spending or tax relief in subsequent quarters, with all behavioral adjustments occurring within the fiscal year in which aid is first received.
APPROACH 3: This approach recognizes the borrowing constraint imposed by the bond market and also the institutional constraints imposed by state and local budgetary rules for the allocation of fiscal resources within a given fiscal year. Once the budget is set (typically at the start of Q3), it remains in force for the remainder of the state or local government's fiscal year, continuing through Q4, then Q1, and Q2 of the subsequent calendar year. Unanticipated federal aid received after the start of the fiscal year may be spent on additional government spending, but it typically cannot be returned through changes in state tax rates (though lump-sum rebates are possible). Once approved, rates must remain in force for the full fiscal year. Budgetary rules therefore mean that a fiscal shock in a current fiscal year (say in Q3, Q4, Q1, or Q2) can affect spending but not tax revenues. Tax changes must wait until the subsequent fiscal year. Under Approach 3, the annualized federal aid shock is extended into the next fiscal year as well to allow for adjustments to annualized state and local tax revenues as well as spending.
In summary, the measured shock in federal aid will be allocated under each of the three approaches as:
APPROACH 1: The shock to fiscal aid is allocated only to the quarter in which the aid is first received.
APPROACH 2: The shock to fiscal aid is allocated to the quarter in which the aid is first received and, on an annualized basis, to all subsequent quarters in that same fiscal year. For example, a shock to aid that is first received in Q4 is also allocated to Q1 and Q2 in that fiscal year.
APPROACH 3a: Aid is approved within a fiscal year but payment is not received until some date in the subsequent fiscal year. In this case, state and local governments can plan spending and tax decisions for next year's budget knowing they will have access to funds. The institutional constraint is no longer binding. The borrowing constraint still applies, but the bond market knows funds will be paid. In this case, the annualized value of the shock to aid is allocated to Q3 and Q4 as well as Q1 and Q2 in the fiscal year in which funds are received. All fiscal adjustments are assumed to occur in this fiscal year.
OR:
APPROACH 3b: Aid is approved within a fiscal year and is paid during that fiscal year. The borrowing constraint is relaxed at the date of program approval, but the institutional constraint remains on tax policy for this fiscal year. In this case, all quarters of that state and local fiscal year after the date of passage are credited with the annualized value of the aid shock and all quarters of the subsequent fiscal year as well. For example, the aid program is approved in Q4 (say, December) of a fiscal year and funding begins in Q1 (say, in February) of the next calendar year. Both approval and funding occur with the fiscal year. In this case Q4, Q1, and Q2 of the year of program approval are credited with the annualized value of the aid shock, as well as Q3 -Q1 of the subsequent fiscal year. This specification allows for both the borrowing and institutional budget constraints in state and local funding. 
NEW AID PROGRAM NARRATIVES AND FUNDING

Federal Highway Act of 1956 (National Interstate and Defense Highway Act):
The act was signed into law by President Eisenhower on June 29, 1956. In his January 7, 1954 State of the Union Address, President Eisenhower spoke forcefully on behalf of a national system of highways as "vital" for the safety and economic prosperity of U.S. citizens. Congress had held extensive hearings in 1953 and responded with the passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act in 1954. The 1954 bill authorized $175 million for an interstate system of highways, to be planned federally but constructed by state governments with expenses shared at the rate of 60 percent federal, 40 percent state. Urban Renewal: Federal government funding for state and local government renewal of urban areas was initially approved in the Housing Act of 1949. The act authorized $500 million in intergovernmental aid over a five-year period, beginning FY 1950. Initial appropriations based on applications from cities and states never exceeded $12 million in any one fiscal year, however. This modest funding changed with the passage of the Housing Act of 1954, introducing major federal funding for public housing constructed by state and local governments. State and local governments were required to submit an application and detailed plans before federal funding could be authorized. Program support was by matching aid, but the local share could be met by the value of private land seized by eminent domain. Thus, no local taxes were required. A major increase in urban renewal funding for cities and states occurred with passage of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. Again applications for funding are required. Urban renewal funding increased from $475 million in FY 1968 before passage to $1.054 billion in FY 1970 after passage -a net increase in funding of $579 million. Abstract, 1959 , "Federal Aid to State and Local Governments: 1953 to 1959 ," p. 403, and The Statistical Abstract, 1970 , "Federal Aid to State and Local Governments: 1964 to 1970 . 
Elementary and Secondary Education
Starting Date and Funding:
Since the Democrats had significant majorities in both chambers and the bill was a top priority for the President, we assume for the narrative analysis that the starting date was the date of initial federal funding, July 1, 1965. For the level of anticipated funding we use the bill's full funding of $1.4 billion per year rather than the transition year funding of $900 million. Anticipated Funding: Given all successful project grants, a total of $1.5 billion was to be allocated. Actual funding levels over the life of the program were $320 million in FY 1971 , $492 million in FY 1972 , $586 million in FY 1973 .
For the narrative analysis we assume that the starting date was the first year of full funding (July 1, 1970) and equaled the full amount of awards of $1.5 billion scheduled over the next three fiscal years. We make no allowance for discounting. 
Re-authorization of Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA):
The original CETA legislation was signed into law by President Nixon in 1973. It was one of the President's block grant initiatives designed to combine many existing grant programs to states, here for labor training and job placement, into a single larger program of comparable funding but with greater state discretion. There was no new money to states with the original passage of the CETA legislation. This was not the case with the re-authorization of the legislation on June 15, 1977. In response to the lingering adverse effects of the 1973-75 recession on state and local budgets, Congress approved and President Jimmy Carter signed legislation that extended CETA funding for one more year. The authorization was for $6.6 billion of new funding. 
COMMENT:
Since four new or re-authorized programs are all assigned announcements dates within Q2, 1977, in our empirical analysis of the effects of aid we will use the combined funding for this date: 
Discontinuation of State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act (General Revenue Sharing):
The election of President Ronald Reagan brought into question the value of General Revenue Sharing (GRS) for state and local governments. Republican control of the Senate gave Reagan a veto-proof position, which he used to cut the state portion of revenue-sharing money, keeping only funding for local governments. Reagan's first budget for FY 1982 , proposed in February 1981 , offered $40 billion in spending cuts, including the entire $2.283 billion previously paid to states as part of GRS. The budget was approved in September 1981 and funding was cut beginning October 1, 1981. The local government lobby was sufficiently strong that the local share of GRS was protected in the FY 1982 budget. The 1980 act renewing local funding did specify $1 billion for countercyclical aid for states if a trigger mechanism equal to two quarters of decline in real GDP occurred. The trigger mechanism was never implemented. We first specify the loss in state GRS funding. 
Starting Date and Funding:
We adopt November 1983 as the starting date for the loss in local government GRS funding of $4.567 billion to begin on October 1, 1986. Because of the certainty of cuts and the long lead time before funding is cut, we do allow for discounting. We discount the loss from October 1986 to November 1983 at the municipal bond interest rate for 1983 of 9.47 percent. The corresponding discount factor will be: .762 = (1/1.0947) 3 .
APPROACH 1: Q4, 1983: -$3.481 billion = .762 x (-$4.567 billion). 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA):
The central aims of PRWORA were to create improved incentives and opportunities for welfare recipients to find work, to give states greater latitude in their policies toward achieving this objective, and to transform federal funding from an entitlement (matching aid) program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to a discretionary program funded by annual appropriations decided by Congress and paid as a fixed (lump-sum) grant to states. Ideas for this reform began in the winter of 1995 within the newly elected, more conservative House of Representatives led by Speaker Newt Gingrich. On March 24, 1995 the first version of PRWORA was passed by the House. The initial version of the legislation made significant cuts in federal support for state welfare spending, and the Senate resisted the legislation. A new bill based on Senate and House compromises was approved in January 1996 but was vetoed by President Clinton because of the large cuts in program support for children in poverty. With the presidential election of 1996 looming, President Clinton wanted to make good on his 1992 pledge to "to reform welfare as we know it." The Republican House also wanted reform. The states wanted more flexibility in spending federal money. The Senate was therefore eager for reform. A compromise bill was fashioned, passing the House on July 18, 1996 and the Senate on July 23. Reconciliation of the two bills occurred on August 22, 1996 and the final version was signed by President Clinton on the same day. A central component of the reform was to remove entitlement for welfare payments to the poor (and thus to the states that administered the programs) and to support states with a new block grant called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Funding began October 1, 1996 for FY 1997.
Starting Date: Three alternative dates might be used: date of initial House proposal, March 24, 1995; date of passage, August 22, 1996; or date of initial funding, October 1, 1996. However, the first full year of TANF support began on October 1, 1997 for FY 1998. We adopt October 1, 1997 as our starting date.
Anticipated Funding: PRWORA funding substituted a lump-sum grant (TANF) for a matching aid grant (AFDC) beginning FY 1997. Nominal TANF funding in that year was $9.726 billion. Full TANF funding began on October 1, 1997 for FY 1998. Funding in that year was $13.284 billion. AFDC funding was reduced at the same time from $14.499 billion in FY 1996 (the last year of the program) to zero since that date. For purposes of estimating the net gain in lump-sum funding to the states from this policy change, we subtract the level of AFDC funding in FY 1996 -viewed as an "as if lump-sum transfer" sufficient to sustain state welfare spending at the date -from the level of TANF funding received beginning FY 1997 and thereafter. The net effect is a small loss in overall federal assistance. Under these assumptions, the net level of real federal aid support for state welfare activities is estimated as -$4.992 billion in FY 1997, -$1.710 billion in FY 1998, -1.153 billion in FY1999, and $-.409 billion in FY2000. The difference turns positive from FY 2001-03, but after that date (under reauthorization of TANF as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) it returns to being a net fiscal loss for the states.
Starting Date and Funding:
We adopt October 1, 1997 as the "full funding" starting date for the substitution of TANF for AFDC financing of welfare funding. We assume that states anticipate the revenue loss to be the difference in the first full year of TANF funding: -$1.710 billion for FY 1998. . The agreements were to give the states a fixed lump-sum "grant" that the state could spend as it wished, although the hope by the health-care community was that a sizable portion of the aid would be spent on tobacco awareness programs and preventive health care. This has not proven to be the case.
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Proceeds from the settlement have been allocated to general government functions or saved as contributions to the states' rainy day funds. Some states have chosen to borrow against future payments from the settlement for current expenditures. The total (nominal) payment over the 27 years of the agreement is set at $206 billion. Initial payments were made in calendar 1998 (FY 20 An alternative expected funding loss to be assigned to Q3 1996 would be the loss in that first fiscal year Increases in Medicaid funding is to be done by a temporary increase in state matching rates for health care spending for eligible low-income residents. We assume that eligible residents are exogenously determined by existing state laws (assumed in place and not amended over the three years of additional funding) and the performance of the state's economy during the recession. 23 Finally, while the ARRA 22 In addition to the $239.2 billion in state aid, the federal government also provided the states with $60.9 billion in extra assistance for the states' unemployment insurance funds. We have not included this funding in federal aid to state and local governments. In our empirical analysis of aid's effects on GDP, we count federal support for UI transfers as transfers by the federal government -through the states -directly to individuals. Since Congress had extended the benefits of the UI program beyond the usual weeks of eligibility, state funds were running deficits. The $60.9 billion allocated to states through ARRA was meant to cover this gap.
funding to states is program specific, the assistance may be assumed to be fully fungible once the money is received by the states. The flexible portion of ARRA is most useful to states, as they can use it for balancing their state budgets. . . . FFIS estimates that these provisions will increase federal Medicaid grants to the states by more than $80 billion over 27 months, freeing up significant state resources for other programs and activities (Italics added).
We have assumed full fungibility in our treatment of ARRA assistance in our narrative analysis. Table 1 provides the data from the narrative record docunment in this paper.
ADDENDUM: Is Federal Aid Expected in Downturns?
While the federal government has no formal obligation to assist state and local governments during economic downturns, Congress has often been responsive to the collective plea of the state/local sector for fiscal assistance, at least since the 1973-75 recession. Assistance has typically taken the form of supplemental funding for already existing federal programs that aid the sector. This was Such consistent congressional responses to the state/local sector's requests for assistance during or just after recessions raise the concern that this assistance might not be truly unexpected and therefore not exogenous. If governors were to anticipate federal assistance in a year following a national recession, what level of assistance might they expect based on this historical record? Prior to 1970, congressional decision-making was dominated by relatively strong political parties. Budgetary decisions were made by the chairmen of the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee. Although there were four recessions from 1948 to 1970, none generated any federal assistance to state governments to help close state deficits. This "top-down" structure to fiscal policy changed with the congressional elections of 1974 and the declining importance of political parties as the basis for selecting and electing members to Congress. Members of Congress now run as independent political agents whose reelection prospects are no longer tied to performance against a party agenda but rather to an explicit ability to meet the needs of local constituents, including state political leaders.
25 After 1974, members pressed for the expansion of the key budgetary committees to ensure member influence over fiscal policy. While it was still possible to resist requests from a single state or local government for assistance (i.e., a "bailout"), as illustrated by the famous example of President Ford's denial of aid to New York City during its fiscal crisis of 1975, when all state and local governments ask for assistance, the congressional response may well be to oblige. The result has been the emergence of post-recession aid beginning with the recession of 1975. After 1975, therefore, governors might have come to expect some form of a federally funded "recession bailout." If so, then unexpected aid -the narrative "shock" -should be the deviation in recession assistance from an expected level of funding.
Given the limited number of observations since the emergence of a locally biased Congress in 1974, there are three ways in which recession-based federal aid might be specified:
The first is to assume that such aid is perfectly anticipated. In this case, the four recession programs should be omitted from the list of narrative (exogenous) aid programs -that is, aid for the recessions of 1973-75 (PWEA, ESSAA, and CETA A second strategy might assume that governors plan on assistance from the federal government equal to their expected annual state deficits at the trough of the recession. Estimates of expected deficits are available from the NASBO survey. 26 For the 1973-75 recession we do not have estimates of expected state deficits, however. Since this is the first fiscal year after the localization of congressional budgeting, it is reasonable to assume that governors had no reason (yet) to expect recession aid. 27 If so, then the recession-based assistance paid in Q2 1977 through PWEA, ESSAA, and CETA funding was fully unanticipated. For all subsequent recessions, unanticipated (narrative) federal aid is computed as the difference between aggregate recession aid for each recession and the aggregate level of anticipated state deficits for the year of the trough of the recession; see Table A A third strategy might assume that only the first recession would involve unanticipated recession aid. This strategy would count the funding in Q2 1977 as unanticipated aid (= $14.85 billion) but all subsequent recession-related aid as fully anticipated.
Analyses might test for robustness of results using each of the three strategies for federal aid during economic downturns. Table 1 
